# **Puppet Anchor and**

# **China's YouTube Information Operation**

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#### **Abstract**

Two thousand "puppet-anchor" YouTube videos - real anchors copy-pasted from other clips with their mouth covered and their voice machine-generated - were uploaded and received 30 million view counts since 2020. This article illustrates that the identical publication times pattern and similar pro-China contents across these videos from eight channels suggest a new type of coordinated information operation, which were later officially confirmed and were taken down by YouTube. This article then discusses

several advantages of these puppet anchor videos, including its low cost, enhancing

the apparent legitimacy of disinformation, and helping the elder generation to consume

the propaganda.

**Keywords**: Youtube, Information Operation, China Politics, Puppet Anchor

Word count: 2936

Introduction

This commentary illustrates a new type of information operations: puppet anchor channels

on YouTube. Figure 1 shows the screenshot of four different puppet anchor channels streaming

before October 10, 2021. In these four videos, an anchor sat on the stage and introduced a news

story, with the transcript presented at the bottom (or the middle) as well as a logo swirling on the

top left corner. At the same time, these anchors acted unlike real humans: their body movements

repeated every few minutes and across different videos (like the two bottom screenshots from two

channels in Figure 1). Their voices were machine-generated (similar to voice produced by Google

Translate), and the content they read was all from China-affiliated news articles. Their mouths

were covered by a big microphone, so the audience could not examine whether their lips and voices

matched. Clearly, these human-like anchors were copy-pasted from other videos and only served

as speakers for China-affiliated news content. They are puppet anchors.



Figure 1. Screenshot of four puppet anchor YouTube channels, October 10, 2021.

## **Research Method and Data Collection**

How many Puppet Anchors are there on YouTube? During the data collection period, from June 2020 to October 2021, this article identified eight YouTube channels sharing four puppet anchors. These eight YouTube channels were identified manually: the first channel was found in June 2020, and the remaining channels were found by the following methods: (1) Some channels were mentioned in other channels' "Channels" or "About" sections. (2) Some channels have similar descriptions and can be searched by specific keywords (e.g., "...this channel's view count) is recently covered by dark clouds, please watch this to help it find the sunshine again!"). (3) Some channels were found through searching terms related to Chinese propaganda on YouTube (e.g., "Biden just surrendered!", "It just happened! China wins again!", "Tsai Ing-wen cried for help!"). This article then checked to see if the videos contained puppet anchors.

Through October 10, 2021, we successfully identified eight channels containing puppet anchors. Subsequently, this article used the *tuber* library in R 4.1.1 to crawl the information of these eight channels, including the list of all videos, view counts, descriptions, hashtags, publication dates, titles, comments, like counts, and video links. This article also downloaded the YouTube videos. This article then analyzed the variables through descriptive analysis. The publication date was transformed from GMT to Beijing's official time zone (Palmer 2019).

#### Result

Finding 1: The emergence and spread of puppet anchor videos

Through October 10, 2021, the overall view count of the eight puppet anchor channels is 31.5 million, and the number of videos uploaded is 2148. The number of puppet anchor channels increased from 3 in 2020 to 8 in 2021. The screenshot of these eight puppet anchors channels can be found in Appendix A4. Figure 2 shows that the number of videos uploaded has increased from around 20 per week (3 per day) in early 2021 to 90 per week (12 per day) in October 2021. Evidence that these videos were also spread through Line and Facebook can be found in Appendix A1.





Figure 2 Total number of puppet anchor videos uploaded by the identified channels, 2021

Finding 2: Evidence of potential China-related coordination

There are three pieces of evidence that these channels coordinated with each other, and the pattern suggests that these channels may originate from China. The first evidence is the time the videos were published. In Figure 3, the left column shows the distribution of the publication times (in Beijing's Time Zone) for the eight channels in 2020, while the right column shows the publication times in 2021. In 2020, only three channels published puppet anchor videos; the first video was usually uploaded before noon, while the second was published around 5pm. The distribution is similar to coordinated behaviors of the Chinese cyber army on Twitter (Author Removed 2020). In other words, the publication times suggest that the videos were created by employees during working hours, not by amateurs after class or work. Moreover, the noon-2pm relative silence could be the result of the lunch break for Chinese officials (Palmer 2019, Author Removed 2020).






Figure 3. Distribution of the publication time of the eight identified channels, 2020 - 2021

Interestingly, all three channels changed their publication pattern *simultaneously* at the start of 2021 and the other five emerging puppet anchor channels also followed this new pattern. The right column in Figure 3 suggests that these channels uploaded videos before noon, around 4pm, and around 8pm. The same lunch break remains. The same pattern *and* the same change of pattern suggest that these channels are coordinated. YouTube's decision to delete all these channels (mentioned in the Implication section above) confirms this inference.

The second piece of evidence linking China to the content coordination is that these channels promoted the same pro-China topics at the same time. Figure 4 shows three major topics covered by these channels in late 2021; each color represents a different channel, and the Y axis is the number of videos mentioning specific topics per week. Between Week 28 and Week 46, all channels attacked the Medigen Vaccine, a COVID-19 vaccine developed in Taiwan with help from the

United States. Between Week 35 and 38, all channels shifted to support Chang Ya-chung, an extremely pro-China KMT chairmanship election candidate who openly supports immediate unification with China. After Chang lost in the KMT chairmanship election on September 25th, the channels no longer mention him. Similarly, on Week 39 and Week 40, all channels suddenly focus on 3Q (Bo-Wei Chen), a pro-independence legislator whose recall election took place on October 23rd.

The last (and perhaps weakest) evidence of China's involvement can be found in the video description and publication date. Although most of the video descriptions and transcripts are written in traditional Chinese (mainly used in Taiwan and Hong Kong), many simplified Chinese characters are also found (mainly used in China and other overseas Chinese communities). Besides, several terms are only used by simplified Chinese speakers. For example, traditional Chinese calls a video "Ing-Pien", while simplified Chinese calls it "Shih-Ping." In addition, one channel self-claimed that it is located in Hong Kong. (Other examples can be found in Appendix A5.) Additionally, there is a noticeable decline in the number of videos in mid-February and the first week of October, and the decline exists across all channels. Mid-February 2021 was the Chinese (Lunar) New Year and October 1st is the National Day of the People's Republic of China. People in China usually have a week off during these two periods (but not in Taiwan). Nevertheless, simplified Chinese terms are used, and the Lunar New Year is celebrated, by overseas Chinese so this last piece of evidence may not be able to exclude the possibility that the videos were from overseas Chinese content firms, such as those found in Malaysia (Liu et al. 2019).




Figure 4. Specific topics promoted by the puppet anchor channels, 2021




Figure 5. Number of puppet anchor videos uploaded by the identified channels, 2021

#### **Discussion**

Puppet anchors in China's information operations

These puppet anchors may serve as one of the new tools in China's information strategy. Previous studies show the Chinese government employs a broad stroke social media strategy focused on mass messaging, encouraging self-censorship rather than direct confrontation, creating an environment of uncertainty. Direct censorship on the internet has proved less effective as journalists frequently develop tactics to circumvent direct measures such as filters or blockers, and risks elevating debates rather than quieting them (Xu 2015, Lorentzen 2014). Instead, China has developed indirect methods to address anti-government sentiment online. China intentionally keeps what online activity prompts government crackdown opaque, leaving activists unclear on how far they can push, leading them to self-censor to ensure they do not cross that line (Stern and Hassid 2012, Xu 2015). Most notably, China employs "strategic distraction" through mass posting efforts, such as the famed 50c army, generating positive messaging either passively to create noise and lessen the visibility of anti-government posts or actively to distract from controversial discussions and change the topic (King, Pan, and Roberts 2017). Low cost, easy to produce puppet anchors would be another application of this strategy to video social media, enabling the same mass posting strategy to create noise and shift the discussion.

The content of these videos center on attacking the ruling party in Taiwan, building up the legitimacy of China, and delegitimizing U.S. involvement with Taiwan. Mass produced videos that appear as legitimate news that use clickbait keywords to achieve a high number of views would serve the same strategy detailed above on the mainland, just with the reverse goal of elevating negative discussions and anti-government sentiment.

Recently, (Author Removed 2020) found that the text-image on Twitter is more important than the 140-word post in explaining the discourse of the Chinese cyber army as well as the criteria for censorship by Twitter. The article also suggests that China may promote its propaganda through YouTube videos, not just words or text-images. Moreover, the YouTube link implies the likelihood of cross-platform coordination. One can share the YouTube link containing the puppet anchor in private messaging apps or on Facebook. This article found some evidence in Appendix A1 that these puppet anchor videos were shared through Facebook and Line. If a viewer sees the same anchor across channels (or in multiple videos) the increased familiarity may result in a greater willingness to accept the content (Lu and Pan 2021).

# Advantages of puppet anchor videos

The first advantage of a puppet anchor video is its low cost. All content can be reused (and the duplicated format implies the likelihood of auto-generation. For example, python can be used to automatically download hot Tiktok videos, combine several of them, create a thumbnail, and then upload it to YouTube. China has previously employed this mass generation technique in its social media strategy through mechanisms like the 50c army as discussed above.

The second advantage is the design of the thumbnail and clickbait title. Appendix A2 shows the screenshots of the front page of all puppet anchor YouTube channels on October 10, 2021. All eight of the YouTube channels that appear in this study have similar thumbnails that feature the following: photoshopped pictures of influential people from China, Taiwan, and sometimes a western country such as the United States or Australia; followed by an attention-grabbing header with

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https://medium.com/@remco.van.akker/we-created-an-automated-youtube-channel-in-python-and-it-went-viral-9bffee426114.
Access: November 23, 2021

a provocative title in red, yellow, green, or blue. This phenomenon is known as clickbait, or the use of flamboyant psychological methods to capture the attention of viewers resulting in a click on the video. There are two easily identifiable aspects of clickbait: the use of provocative syntax and diction, as well as the use of bright colors to draw in the attention of the viewers (Hanada 2020). The provocative aspect may take advantage of viewers' natural inclinations to want to satisfy their curiosity (Loewenstein 1994, Lu and Pan 2021, Potthast et al. 2018). The clickbait titles purport to offer information that the viewer does not already have, and this prompts the viewer to want to click to fill the information gap.

These thumbnails follow this method exactly. First, almost all videos include clickbait titles such as: "must read today! (本日必看)", "cannot miss this! (不能錯過)", "the true story! (真相)", "US surrender! (美國軟了)", "Tsai surrenders! (蔡英文軟了)", "Just Happened! (大事剛發生!)." Clickbait often includes inflated language with the hopes of catching a viewer's attention. The use of words such as "must", "cannot miss," and "surrenders" are carefully selected words with the hope of eliciting an emotional response from viewers leading the viewer to select the video (Wu et al. 2020).

The third advantage is that the puppet anchor may enhance the legitimacy of the misinformation and may help creators target a particular group (i.e., the elderly). The content behind these videos is mostly from China Times, a China-affiliated news agency in Taiwan (Kao 2020; Wang 2020). In a 2019 survey of journalists and editors in Taiwan, 60% chose China Times as the news source they would be least likely to read (Hsu 2019). However, puppet anchors transformed content from China Times to a news program-like format, with an anchor, stage, and transcript which

may persuade the audience to believe that it is a kind of independent self-media. Therefore, it may serve to enhance the legitimacy of its source.

Future research agenda on puppet anchors and YouTube propaganda

The last advantage of the puppet anchor approach is the difficulty with which it can be detected. Literature on deepfake detection focuses on facial features (Mittal et al. 2020) or the distinct level of resolution on the face (Li and Lyu 2018). For these puppet anchors, however, part of their face is covered, and the resolution of the videos may not be downgraded. Machine-generated voices are used widely in many other types of videos, such as political mockery clips.

The difficulty of puppet anchor detection is evidenced by the cooperation between the authors and YouTube. On October 21st, the authors of this article received a letter from YouTube that they noticed the existence of puppet anchors and deleted three channels reported by one author of this article. YouTube reviewed the content in these three channels and confirmed that these channels violated its misinformation policy.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, YouTube failed to find the other five channels and invited the authors to provide the full list. After the list was provided, the remaining five channels were terminated on October 25th for "multiple violations of YouTube policy." One screenshot of the decision to terminate is shown in Appendix A3. YouTube's decision to terminate the eight puppet anchor channels confirms the major findings of this article so far as the collaboration and spread of misinformation. However, the request from YouTube also demonstrates the difficulty in detecting puppet anchor videos.

Given the low-cost, attention-catching, easy-to-spread, hard-to-detect, nature of these videos and the potential for auto-generation, it is foreseeable that these puppet anchor channels will

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/10834785?hl=zh-Hant. Access: November 18, 2021.

reemerge in the future and across different languages. Unfortunately, we had observed the reappearance of these puppet anchor channels on Youtube after the first eight channels were taken down.<sup>3</sup> Future work in studying puppet anchors may focus on its linkage to deepfake, cross-plat-form coordination, and content-detection.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> e.g. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/5alldaylong5/videos">https://www.youtube.com/user/5alldaylong5/videos</a> Access: January 31, 2022. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/miguelonna/videos">https://www.youtube.com/c/As%C4%B0GaMeR142/videos</a> Access: January 31, 2022. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/miguelonna/videos">https://www.youtube.com/user/miguelonna/videos</a> Access: January 31, 2022.

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  <a href="https://www.me-diawatch.org.tw/sites/de-fault/files/files/2019%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E5%AA">https://www.me-diawatch.org.tw/sites/de-fault/files/files/2019%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E5%AA</a>

  <a href="https://www.me-diawatch.org.tw/sites/de-fault/files/files/2019%E5%8F%AF%E4%BF%A1%E5%BA%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9">https://www.me-fault/files/files/2019%E5%8F%AF%E4%BF%A1%E5%BA%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9</a>

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  <a href="https://www.me-maintenance.new.gov/sites/de-gate-fault/files/files/2019%E5%8F%AF%E4%BF%A1%E5%BA%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9">https://www.me-maintenance.new.gov/sites/de-gate-fault/files/files/files/2019%E5%8F%AF%E4%BF%A1%E5%BA%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9</a>

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Screenshot of puppet anchor videos shared on Facebook and Line. August 4, 2021.

# A2. Screenshots of the front page of the identified puppet anchor channels on October 10, 2021







# 更新新聞

72.6K subscribers

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CHANNELS

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民進黨開始著急了!小英無法救了!蘇貞昌被提告~陳其...

179 views • 17 minutes ago



陳其邁這次躲不了!高雄惡火 釀46死 韓國瑜淚聲一句引5...

7.1K views • 19 hours ago



剛剛傳來不幸消息,論文門最終審判!蔡英文論文門38年...

17K views • 21 hours ago



急報!民進黨這些人急了!蔡 英文正式下令全黨力挺陳柏...

2.7K views • 1 day ago



蘇貞昌這次下場了?!! 公道 奪回就在今天...韓國瑜怒喊...

7.3K views • 1 day ago



小英沒法救了! 蘇貞昌散佈假訊息被提告~蘇貞昌為何痛...

16K views • 2 days ago



震撼! 媒體不敢報導!小英現形了!還彭文正公道!韓...

9.8K views • 2 days ago



震撼!小英現形記~彭文正這 次恐大勝?!罷免倒數12天 ...

4.8K views • 3 days ago



剛剛傳來不幸消息, 蔡這次真慘!論文案最終審判~彭P秀...

15K views • 3 days ago



急報!民進黨不行了!蔡英文 最怕的事發生!韓國瑜淚聲...

23K views • 4 days ago



HOME

政事台內

55.3K subscribers

VIDEOS PLAYLISTS

COMMUNITY

NITY CHANNELS

ABOUT

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SUBSCRIBE

Uploads PLAY ALL



還韓國瑜公道!小英沒法救了! 陳其邁該為城中城大火...

他留言:妳的12年幫這棟大樓做了12:03

304 views • 27 minutes ago



剛剛傳來不幸消息,高雄出大事氣爆~韓國瑜心疼一句令...

6.8K views • 20 hours ago



今日必看, 陳柏惟哭了!蔡英 文宣布全黨挺3Q! 范雲反罷...

5K views • 1 day ago



民進黨開始著急了!小英全 敗?!彭文正彭公佈「論文...

20K views • 1 day ago



今天一定要看!不尋常的消息, 蔡英文最終還是出手了! ...

7.4K views • 2 days ago



小媒體不敢報導, 英這次過不了?!法院最终审判. 彭文正...

11K views • 2 days ago



急報!今日必看!! 民進黨 出大事了!彭文正成功了?! ...

9.1K views • 2 days ago



急報!民進黨最怕的事發生! 韓國瑜確認**11**月返回政壇淚...

10K views • 3 days ago



千萬要看!再瞞下去就要出大事了!蔡英文最怕的~論文...

13K views • 3 days ago



小英這次過不了! 陳柏惟哭: 全黨滅我一人! 英法突然宣...

6.1K views • 5 days ago



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VIDEOS

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10月12日!中国终于超越美国走上第一...特朗普一家现...

117 views • 1 day ago



杨洁篪沙利文瑞典苏黎世会晤第1天,会谈结果出炉!戴琦...

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突发!就在刚刚中国不忍了! 取代美国~华春莹宣布对美...

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从未见过美国如此狼狈~逼台 积电交出商业机密,郭正亮...

345 views • 1 week ago



急报!今早大爆炸消息!晚舟 回国第5天!中国终于做出...

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9月27日一大早,出大事了! 孟晚舟羁押1028天获释~美...

257 views • 2 weeks ago



9月24日,忍无可忍,中国对 澳大利亚出重拳,莫里森这...

174 views • 2 weeks ago



9月23日,日本不行了!联合 国正式宣布!中国出任联合...

310 views • 3 weeks ago



9月22日一大早,最坏消息传来!蔡政府魔来了! 蔡英文...

278 views • 3 weeks ago



急报!千万要看!宣布召回驻 美驻澳大使1天,法国又有...

409 views • 3 weeks ago



HOME

我愛台灣

26.7K subscribers

**VIDEOS** 

...

PLAYLISTS

COMMUNITY

CHANNELS

ABOUT

Q

SUBSCRIBE

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Uploads PLAY ALL



急報!蔡政府麻煩了!史上最 慘! 蘇貞昌蔡英文得意高雄...

36 views • 25 minutes ago



千萬要看!陳柏惟哭了!蔡英 文正式下令全黨力挺陳柏惟...

373 views • 19 hours ago



必看!爆炸消息!小英大哭 了! 彭文正彭公佈「論文...

206 views • 22 hours ago



急報!爆炸消息!還彭文正公 道!直搗LSE神秘"台灣研究...

479 views • 1 day ago



必看!藜英文縮手了!陳柏惟 走定了?罷免案引爆塔綠班...

441 views • 1 day ago



爆炸消息!蔡英文最終還是出 手了! 蘇貞昌這次下場了?...

758 views • 1 day ago



千萬要看!蔡政府尷尬了!痛 罵鄭麗文後蘇貞昌現身了自...

441 views • 1 day ago



急報!小英大哭了!蔡英文尊 重謝志偉舉國旗吐血 張亞中...

622 views • 2 days ago



急報!出大事了!蔡這次真 慘!小英大哭求彭文正別再...

1.4K views • 2 days ago



就在剛剛!小英尷尬了!馬英 九誤會了?彭文正曝蔡英文...

351 views • 3 days ago



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暫退娛樂圈2年, 卻被傳去世 20年,"賀歲公主"卓依婷現...

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熱點10/14:王力宏身價10億 「襪子破洞還在穿」真實原...

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1973年李小龍死在丁佩床 上,到底發生了什麼? 42...

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1999年左右的謝霆鋒火到什 麼程度?人氣直逼"四大天...

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恭喜!唐嫣前男友邱澤二度摘 得台北影帝,並甜蜜告白新...

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霍建華大起大落:從古風頂流 到無人問津,他究竟經歷了...

504 views • 3 days ago



成龍父親房道龍重病臥床,眼 看就不行了,他把成龍叫到...

515 views • 3 days ago



急報!大S再傳新消息,在家 低調慶生十分開心,已經與...

2.8K views • 3 days ago



謝霆鋒不再婚,謝賢坦言心疼 張柏芝!謝霆鋒和王菲:不...

2K views • 5 days ago



歐陽娜娜,走到今天這個地 步,說到底咎由自取

359 views • 6 days ago



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今天必看」蔡英文公然 販"獨"必遭民眾唾棄!台灣...

79 views • 19 hours ago



急報!急報!渴望"秩序和權 威",習近平全方位整頓中...

96 views • 23 hours ago



「千萬要看」台灣雙十國慶 蔡英文演講強硬回應北京,...

56 views • 1 day ago



急報!千萬要看!習近平鬆口 後 蔡英文劃出"兩國"界限強...

411 views • 3 days ago



熱點10/12:台灣慶雙十國 慶, 蔡英文演說: "四個堅...

93 views • 3 days ago



急報! 急報! 中國軍機擾台引 發擔憂台灣警告中國的意味...

258 views • 5 days ago



急報!小英慌了! 150架次大 陸軍機台海演練!習近平威...

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必看!爆炸消息!不顧北京反 對和大機群擾台,法國參議...

216 views • 6 days ago



急報!急報!台海正變火藥桶 是習近平親自下令?! 拔劍...


207 views • 6 days ago



急報!急報!今天必看!蔡英 文:正告北京克制避免擦槍...

222 views • 1 week ago

# Appendix A3. Screenshot for channel No.8 being terminated on November 11, 2021



# A4. Screenshots of the eight puppet anchor YouTube channels on October 10, 2021



熱點10/03必看:陳柏惟罷免案 民進黨為衝票恐出這招救陳柏惟!刪Q、罷昶 朱立倫火力全開!陳柏惟昔影片遭起底 藍青年曝「無賴套路」:對這種人不必客氣、趙少康痛批:正事不做只走偏門

999 views • Oct 3, 2021



小英沒法救了! 陳柏惟百分之百被罷免! 陳柏惟哭:全黨滅我一人! 還韓國瑜公道! 李眉蓁PO文挺罷免陳柏惟慘遭塔緣班出征4大「戰鬥藍青年」出征! 罷韓跳出來大喊: 都怪韓國瑜~民進黨翻臉支持罷免~趙少康親自加

4,222 views • Oct 9, 2021



千萬要看!再瞞下去就要出大事了!小英全慌了!還韓國瑜公道! 4大「戰鬥藍青年」出征!陳柏惟完蛋了!趙少 康親自加持~韓國瑜赴美國神隱ing,追查蔡英文「論文門」案~罷韓血淋淋宣戰了蔡英文工資連6年調

36,899 views • Oct 9, 2021

**△** 1K

V 29

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itube.com/watch?v=V7vLIbORLIHHM



小英這次過不了!陳柏惟哭:全黨滅我一人! 英法突然宣布.10月論文案...彭文正大對話!韓國瑜聽完後也信服了~被 起訴也要追到底~! 4大「戰鬥藍青年」出征! 趙少康親自加持~台大賀德芬11/4狀告教育部

6,163 views • Oct 9, 2021

△ 185 

□ 9 


⇒ SHARE 

=+ SAVE ...



急报!今早大爆炸消息!晚舟回国第5天!中国终于做出决定,华春莹宣布有关加拿大重磅决定! 150家分行被 矣!股价狂跌30%,营业额一天净亏42亿!那个帮美加抓捕孟晚舟背后最大推手汇丰银行报应来了!

454 views • Sep 30, 2021





急報!公道奪回在這天..彭文正成功了!小英害怕了轉過支持罷免!英國ICO向彭P道歉! 陳柏惟被罷定?李眉蓁PO文挺罷免3Q惨遭塔綠班出征 趙少康、彭文正強強聯手擊倒塔綠班

872 views • Oct 9, 2021



謝霆鋒不再婚,謝賢坦言心疼張柏芝!謝霆鋒和王菲:不會結婚的情侶,談一輩子戀愛也很好

2,039 views • Oct 9, 2021



# Appendix A5. Simplified Chinese character and terms in the description section of Puppet Anchor videos



大家好!歡迎來到台灣新聞頻道,本節目為你提供最新最好的信息」最近頻道嚴重烏雲罩頂,您可以多看幾遍或放著多聽幾次有助於我們突破烏雲,迎向陽光!看完廣告(不要略過廣告)就是給我們最好的鼓勵了,感謝!

基進黨立委陳柏惟罷免案將於23日投票,總統蔡英文13日在民進黨中常會首度表態挺陳,強調不希望陳成為「全黨打一人」惡鬥下的犧牲品。對此,港媒評論指出,蔡對陳的罷免案遠較高雄市議員 黃捷罷免案保留,因為陳被罷免機率遠高於黃,但蔡仍表態自己挺陳的立場,原因就是她怕一旦陳 被罷免,形同她輸給了新上任的國民黨主席朱立倫,讓她吃下「蔡朱對決」的首敗。

香港媒體《中評社》14日評論指出,民進黨立委近日紛紛在臉書上發文留言,公開表態支持陳柏惟、反對罷免案;蔡英文13日則在黨內中常會表示,「黨公職和支持者也都很關心罷免案,很多也都在幫忙,她請大家繼續關注這件事情,不要讓認真做事的人孤單,台灣的民主深化,應該是基於理性溝通,不是惡意報復」,這是蔡對「刪Q」案的首度表態卻也僅止於此。

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